By Simpson Global Media News Desk.
World leaders are meeting at the United Nations in New York on Friday, September 25, for a major review of how countries prepare for future pandemics, five years after COVID-19 exposed major weaknesses in global health systems and international cooperation.
The United Nations General Assembly’s second high-level meeting on Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response is bringing together governments, international organisations, health officials, scientists, civil-society representatives and private-sector participants to consider a new political declaration designed to strengthen global preparedness for health emergencies.
The meeting comes at a significant moment.
Countries are still dealing with infectious-disease threats, including a major Ebola outbreak in Central Africa, while health systems in many parts of the world continue to face financing pressures, workforce shortages and gaps in surveillance and emergency-response capacity.
The World Health Organization says substantial progress has been made since the first UN high-level pandemic meeting in 2023, including the adoption of the WHO Pandemic Agreement, strengthened International Health Regulations, the establishment of the Pandemic Fund and new international mechanisms for epidemic intelligence and emergency response.
But WHO also says major gaps remain.
The September 25 meeting is therefore focused not only on the lessons of COVID-19, but on whether countries can turn those lessons into lasting systems capable of detecting threats earlier, responding faster and ensuring that vaccines, medicines, diagnostics and other essential tools reach countries that need them.
The meeting is scheduled to run from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. New York time, with opening and closing sessions, a plenary segment and two multi-stakeholder panels. The United Nations says the proceedings are being webcast.
A new global health test
The central question facing governments is straightforward but difficult to answer: how can the world avoid repeating the failures exposed by COVID-19 when the next major health emergency arrives?
COVID-19 demonstrated how quickly an infectious disease could cross borders and overwhelm health systems.
It also exposed differences between countries in access to medical supplies, vaccines, diagnostic capacity, financing and emergency-response infrastructure.
The pandemic showed that even countries with sophisticated hospitals and research institutions could experience shortages and disruptions when demand increased simultaneously across the world.
It also demonstrated that health emergencies are not confined to health ministries.
Air travel, trade, education, agriculture, workplaces, supply chains and national economies can all be affected.
The United Nations meeting is consequently taking a broad approach.
Its theme is “Fostering a multilateral and intergenerational approach to prevent, prepare for and respond to pandemics and public health emergencies through the principles of equity and solidarity.”
The meeting was established under UN General Assembly Resolution 79/333 and is intended to culminate in approval of a concise, action-oriented political declaration that was negotiated in advance by member states.
Why the meeting matters now
The timing is particularly important because the global health environment has changed since COVID-19.
Countries have developed new surveillance systems and emergency-response mechanisms.
The WHO Pandemic Fund has been created to support preparedness.
The WHO Hub for Pandemic and Epidemic Intelligence is intended to strengthen the use of information and analysis for detecting health threats.
The WHO BioHub System is designed to support the secure sharing of biological materials.
The Global Health Emergency Corps has also been established to strengthen the health workforce available for emergency response.
At the same time, the WHO says recent outbreaks of Ebola, mpox, cholera and hantavirus demonstrate that infectious-disease risks remain active.
The organisation says the world now has stronger tools and institutions than it did before COVID-19, but argues that preparedness requires sustained political commitment, financing, resilient health systems, scientific trust and international cooperation.
That creates a difficult balance.
Governments must prepare for threats that may not produce an immediate political or economic return.
Hospitals need emergency capacity even when no emergency is occurring.
Disease-surveillance systems must operate continuously.
Laboratories require trained personnel and equipment before an outbreak happens.
Vaccines and medicines need manufacturing capacity that can be scaled when demand suddenly rises.
The cost of maintaining these systems can be substantial, but the cost of building them after an emergency begins can be much higher.
Ebola adds urgency to the discussions
The UN meeting is taking place against the backdrop of an ongoing Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
That outbreak has added a real-time dimension to discussions that might otherwise have remained largely focused on lessons from the COVID-19 era.
WHO has specifically referenced the current Ebola situation in its preparations for the UN meeting.
The organisation says the pandemic-preparedness declaration is being considered at a time when countries are once again confronting a major health emergency and when the world is assessing whether the systems developed since COVID-19 are strong enough to respond effectively.
Ebola also illustrates why early detection matters.
The disease can cause severe illness and death, but outbreaks can be contained when cases are detected rapidly, contacts are traced, infection-prevention measures are applied and communities participate in the response.
That requires trained health workers, laboratories, surveillance networks, protective equipment and effective communication.
Those systems have to be in place before the first cases appear.
The declaration is about implementation
The political declaration being considered at the UN is not intended to create another standalone health institution.
Instead, it is designed to reinforce commitments already being developed through the international health system.
WHO says the declaration is expected to support implementation of the strengthened International Health Regulations, progress toward entry into force of the WHO Pandemic Agreement, completion of negotiations on the Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing annex, stronger surveillance and early-warning systems, equitable access to vaccines and diagnostics, sustainable financing and investment in resilient health systems.
The list reflects one of the major lessons of COVID-19: preparedness depends on several systems functioning together.
A country can have excellent hospitals but weak surveillance.
It can have surveillance but inadequate laboratories.
It can have laboratories but lack the financing needed to purchase medical supplies.
It can have vaccines available internationally but insufficient infrastructure to distribute them.
A pandemic response is therefore only as strong as the connections between those systems.
The Pandemic Agreement
One of the most important developments since the first UN pandemic meeting has been the WHO Pandemic Agreement.
WHO identifies adoption of the agreement as a major development in international pandemic preparedness.
The agreement is intended to strengthen international cooperation on preventing, preparing for and responding to future pandemics.
However, further work remains before the agreement can fully operate.
One of the outstanding elements is the Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing, or PABS, annex.
The annex concerns how pathogen materials and genetic information can be shared and how benefits from resulting products can be distributed.
WHO said in September that member states had advanced negotiations on the annex ahead of the September 25 UN meeting.
The organisation said completing the annex would help pave the way for countries to sign and consider ratification of the Pandemic Agreement.
The issue is technically complex because scientific research often depends on rapid access to pathogen samples and information.
At the same time, countries and communities want assurances that sharing biological resources will produce benefits that are fairly distributed.
That debate became particularly important during COVID-19, when questions over access to vaccines, technologies and manufacturing capacity became major international issues.
Equity remains a central issue
The question of equity is one of the most difficult issues facing the international pandemic-preparedness system.
COVID-19 produced sharp differences in access to vaccines, treatments and testing.
Countries with strong purchasing power were able to secure large quantities of vaccines early, while many lower-income countries waited longer for supplies.
The experience generated renewed discussion about regional manufacturing.
Instead of depending entirely on a small number of manufacturing centres, countries and regions are seeking greater capacity to produce vaccines, diagnostics and other medical products closer to where they are needed.
WHO says expanded support for regional vaccine manufacturing is among the developments since 2023.
The organisation also identifies sustainable financing and resilient health systems as continuing priorities.
For Africa, the issue is especially significant.
The continent has been working to strengthen local pharmaceutical and vaccine manufacturing capacity while improving disease surveillance and emergency-response systems.
The argument is not simply about producing vaccines domestically.
It also involves the ability to conduct research, manufacture diagnostic products, develop supply chains and maintain skilled technical workforces.
The September UN discussions provide an opportunity to connect those priorities to the broader international preparedness framework.
Surveillance is the first line of defence
One of the clearest lessons from recent outbreaks is that time matters.
The earlier a dangerous pathogen is detected, the greater the opportunity to contain it before it spreads widely.
That makes surveillance one of the most important components of pandemic preparedness.
Modern surveillance is increasingly based on multiple sources.
Hospitals and clinics provide reports of unusual illnesses.
Laboratories identify pathogens.
Border and travel systems can provide information about movement.
Wastewater surveillance can sometimes detect pathogens before large numbers of people seek medical treatment.
Genomic sequencing can help scientists understand how a pathogen is changing and whether different cases are connected.
Digital systems can help health authorities combine these sources.
WHO has been developing its Hub for Pandemic and Epidemic Intelligence to improve the use of data and analysis in detecting and assessing health threats.
But technology alone cannot solve the problem.
Someone still has to collect the data.
Laboratories need trained staff.
Health authorities need mechanisms for sharing information.
Communities need confidence in the institutions communicating with them.
And governments need the authority and resources to act when surveillance systems detect a threat.
Artificial intelligence enters the preparedness debate
Artificial intelligence is also becoming part of the global health discussion.
AI systems can analyse large amounts of information and potentially assist scientists and health authorities in identifying unusual patterns.
That could be useful in epidemic intelligence.
The WHO has highlighted digital innovation and artificial intelligence among the issues being discussed during the 81st UN General Assembly.
A September 25 presidential dialogue is also examining high-threat pathogens and AI-assisted preparedness intelligence in Africa.
AI, however, introduces its own questions.
Health authorities need reliable data.
Algorithms can produce misleading results when data is incomplete or biased.
Sensitive medical information must be protected.
Countries also need trained professionals who can understand and verify AI-generated findings.
For that reason, AI is increasingly being treated as a tool within preparedness systems rather than as a replacement for epidemiologists, laboratories, doctors and public-health institutions.
The broader UN debate on AI has also included questions about governance and international oversight.
UN Secretary-General António Guterres called for stronger global governance of artificial intelligence during his final UN General Assembly address as secretary-general, including a multilateral AI risk-management framework with independent oversight.
The overlap between AI governance and health preparedness is likely to grow as governments use increasingly sophisticated digital systems to monitor emerging disease threats.
Financing remains a difficult problem
Preparedness requires money before an emergency happens.
That is one of its fundamental challenges.
Governments and donors may find it easier to mobilise funding after a major outbreak has begun than to finance surveillance systems, laboratory networks and emergency stockpiles during periods of relative calm.
Yet waiting until a crisis begins can leave countries scrambling to build capacity when time is already running out.
WHO has therefore identified sustainable financing as a key issue for the UN meeting.
The Pandemic Fund was established to provide additional financing for pandemic prevention and preparedness.
But funding requirements extend far beyond one mechanism.
Countries need functioning primary healthcare systems.
They need laboratories.
They need trained workers.
They need emergency transport.
They need reliable supply chains.
They need digital systems.
They need infection-prevention infrastructure.
They need public-health institutions capable of coordinating across national and regional levels.
That makes pandemic preparedness part of broader health-system development.
The health workforce question
No preparedness system can operate without people.
COVID-19 demonstrated the importance of nurses, doctors, laboratory scientists, epidemiologists, community-health workers, emergency responders and other specialists.
It also exposed workforce shortages and exhaustion in many countries.
A future pandemic could place similar pressure on health workers.
WHO has therefore identified resilient health workforces as part of the continuing international preparedness agenda.
Training is only one part of the challenge.
Countries also have to retain experienced personnel.
That can be difficult when health professionals migrate to countries offering better salaries and working conditions.
The resulting shortage can weaken health systems precisely when they are most needed.
For lower-income countries, international cooperation on training, financing and workforce development therefore forms part of pandemic preparedness.
The One Health approach
Another major theme in the global preparedness debate is the One Health approach.
The concept recognises the connections between human health, animal health and the environment.
Many emerging infectious diseases originate in animals before spreading to humans.
That means monitoring human disease alone may not provide sufficient warning.
Veterinary authorities, wildlife experts, environmental agencies and public-health institutions may need to share information.
WHO says the international preparedness agenda includes stronger investment in One Health approaches.
The approach is particularly relevant as climate change, land-use changes, urbanisation, wildlife trade and increased human-animal interaction alter the conditions under which infectious diseases can emerge and spread.
Preparedness therefore increasingly extends beyond hospitals and laboratories.
It involves agriculture, environmental management, wildlife surveillance and community behaviour.
Trust is another critical factor
Public trust became one of the most important challenges during COVID-19.
Governments and health authorities had to communicate rapidly while scientific understanding of the virus was still evolving.
Recommendations changed as new evidence emerged.
In some communities, those changes were interpreted as contradictions rather than normal scientific updates.
Misinformation and conspiracy theories also spread rapidly through social media.
The result was that some people became less willing to follow public-health guidance.
WHO has therefore repeatedly identified trust and science-based communication as important elements of preparedness.
A future emergency could produce similar communication challenges, particularly as artificial intelligence makes it easier to create and distribute convincing false information.
Health agencies will need communication systems capable of responding quickly while acknowledging uncertainty.
The role of international cooperation
No country can completely isolate itself from an infectious disease threat.
A pathogen can travel with people.
It can move through animals.
It can cross borders through trade.
It can spread before symptoms are recognised.
That makes international information-sharing essential.
But countries also have legitimate concerns about sovereignty, economic disruption and the consequences of reporting outbreaks.
A government that identifies a new infectious disease may fear travel restrictions, trade losses or damage to tourism.
International preparedness mechanisms therefore have to create incentives for transparency.
That is one reason the global pandemic architecture focuses on cooperation, equitable access to tools and support for countries reporting health threats.
The objective is to make early reporting part of collective protection rather than a punishment for the country where an outbreak is first detected.
COVID-19 changed the international conversation
The world entered the COVID-19 pandemic with many preparedness systems that looked stronger on paper than they proved to be in practice.
Some countries had emergency plans but struggled to implement them.
Supply chains broke down.
Protective equipment became scarce.
Testing capacity varied dramatically.
Vaccines were developed at unprecedented speed, but access was uneven.
Hospitals faced severe pressure.
The experience created a broad recognition that preparedness needed to be treated as a continuous process.
The 2023 UN high-level meeting was part of that response.
The September 2026 meeting is the next major checkpoint.
It is intended to assess progress since 2023 and maintain political momentum.
WHO says the meeting is designed to review progress and agree on actions needed to strengthen global preparedness.
What countries are being asked to do
The agenda before governments is broad.
They are being asked to strengthen surveillance.
They are being asked to improve early-warning systems.
They are being asked to invest in resilient health systems.
They are being asked to support equitable access to vaccines, diagnostics and treatments.
They are being asked to strengthen financing.
They are being asked to improve regional manufacturing.
They are being asked to support the health workforce.
They are being asked to improve cooperation across human, animal and environmental health.
And they are being asked to strengthen the international legal and institutional framework for pandemic response.
These commitments will matter only if they are translated into national programmes.
A declaration adopted in New York cannot itself build a laboratory in a rural district.
It cannot train an epidemiologist.
It cannot stock a hospital with protective equipment.
Those actions require national budgets, international financing, institutions and implementation.
Africa has particular stakes
Africa's experience with Ebola and other outbreaks has made the continent an important part of the international preparedness discussion.
African countries have developed substantial expertise in outbreak response, contact tracing, community engagement and public-health surveillance.
At the same time, many countries still face shortages of laboratory infrastructure, medical manufacturing capacity and health workers.
The continent's health-security needs are therefore closely connected to the global agenda.
WHO's September 25 programme specifically includes a presidential dialogue on high-threat pathogens and AI-assisted preparedness intelligence in Africa.
That reflects a wider effort to develop regional capacity rather than relying exclusively on institutions outside the continent.
Regional manufacturing could reduce delays during emergencies.
Regional disease-surveillance networks could improve early warning.
Regional research institutions could strengthen scientific capacity.
And stronger health systems could improve routine healthcare even when there is no pandemic.
What happens after the UN meeting?
The immediate outcome will be the political declaration and the commitments governments make around it.
But the more important developments will occur afterward.
Countries will need to translate international commitments into national plans.
International organisations will need to monitor implementation.
Financing institutions will need to determine how preparedness projects are funded.
Health ministries will need to coordinate with finance, agriculture, environment, transport and other government departments.
Research institutions will need to continue developing surveillance and diagnostic technologies.
And communities will need to remain involved.
The UN meeting itself is therefore only one stage in a longer process.
The declaration can establish political direction, but implementation will determine whether the world is actually better prepared when the next major outbreak arrives.
A test of whether lessons have been retained
Five years after the worst period of COVID-19, the global health system has more tools than it did before.
The WHO Pandemic Agreement has been adopted.
The International Health Regulations have been strengthened.
The Pandemic Fund exists.
New epidemic-intelligence mechanisms have been developed.
Regional vaccine manufacturing has received greater attention.
The Global Health Emergency Corps has been established.
But the existence of these mechanisms does not automatically guarantee preparedness.
They have to be financed.
They have to be used.
Countries have to share information.
Health workers have to be trained.
Laboratories have to remain operational.
Communities have to trust public-health authorities.
And governments have to cooperate even when national interests differ.
That is the central challenge facing the September 25 meeting.
The wider international picture
The pandemic preparedness meeting is taking place during a UN General Assembly session dominated by multiple global crises.
Wars, economic pressures, climate-related disasters, technological disruption and humanitarian emergencies are competing for governments' attention.
The Associated Press has described this year's UN gathering as taking place amid wars in the Middle East and Ukraine, economic instability, climate-related disasters and concerns about the changing international order.
Those pressures make sustained investment in pandemic preparedness more difficult.
Governments have limited resources and competing priorities.
But they also demonstrate why preparedness is increasingly treated as part of national and international resilience.
A disease outbreak can affect economies, food systems, transport networks and public security.
A major epidemic can therefore become a crisis far beyond the health sector.
The next pandemic may not look like COVID-19
Another lesson from the current debate is that preparedness cannot be built around one specific disease.
The next global health emergency could involve a respiratory virus, a haemorrhagic fever, an antimicrobial-resistant organism or another pathogen not yet identified.
It could spread faster or slower than COVID-19.
It could have different symptoms.
It could affect different age groups.
It could emerge in an unexpected region.
Preparedness systems therefore have to be flexible.
They need to detect unusual events rather than simply search for one known pathogen.
They need laboratories capable of identifying unfamiliar threats.
They need emergency plans that can be adapted.
They need supply chains capable of scaling.
And they need international mechanisms that can respond even when scientific information is incomplete.
From declaration to preparedness
The UN meeting in New York represents another attempt to turn the experience of COVID-19 into permanent changes in the global health system.
The international community has already created new mechanisms since the pandemic.
The challenge now is maintaining them.
WHO says the world has stronger preparedness tools and frameworks than it did five years ago, but stresses that important challenges remain.
The current Ebola outbreak provides a reminder that infectious-disease emergencies have not disappeared.
The September 25 meeting is therefore not simply a commemoration of COVID-19.
It is a practical discussion about whether governments are willing and able to maintain the systems required before the next crisis begins.
The outcome will be measured less by speeches in the UN General Assembly than by what happens in national health budgets, laboratories, hospitals, surveillance networks, vaccine factories and emergency-response teams.
The ultimate test will come when the world faces another serious health threat.
If detection is faster, information moves more quickly, treatments and vaccines are distributed more equitably, health workers are better protected and countries coordinate earlier, the investments made after COVID-19 will have produced tangible results.
If those systems weaken because funding, political attention or international cooperation fades, many of the vulnerabilities exposed by the pandemic could return.
For now, governments are being asked to make preparedness a continuing commitment rather than an emergency reaction.
At the United Nations on September 25, that commitment is once again at the centre of the global agenda.
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